

Towards Privacy in the RFID Ecosystem

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RFID Privacy Threats

Malicious Attackers

- Outsider gains access to data
- Insider compromises RFID hardware

"Curious" Users

- Peer or superior obtains private data
- Peers collude to learn even more

Institutional Surveillance

- System owner tracks users
- Unauthorized or unclear policies:
 - Onward transfer
 - Retention


Research Questions

- How can privacy be built-in?
- Can we leverage data privacy techniques?
- How can attacks be detected, prevented, and deterred?
- How to provide privacy when data is probabilistic?
- How can users understand, control, and manage privacy?




Privacy vs. Utility

- Balance is crucial
- Utility to support applications
- Principled info disclosure:
 - What, when, where, how, and to whom to disclose?



Default Policy: Physical Access Control



Colocation	Start	End	Detected
A, C	2	5	X
D, C	7	15	X
D, E	7	9	-
C, E	7	9	-
A, E	9	9	X
F, E	12	15	-

PAC in a nutshell:

- Each user carries an ID tag
- Users access only RFID events they *could have seen in person*

- Combine virtues of network-based and wearable computing models
- Implement with authorization views:
 - Fine-grained access control
- Defined by rules which may depend on context stored in helper tables
- May leverage database techniques for handling probabilistic data
- Extensions can be implemented with additional views

Extensions to PAC

- Add a set of administrator-defined system-wide database queries
- Explicit, user-defined permissions to grant access to captured data
- Define rules based on detected context events (i.e. "coffee-break")
- Incorporate data privacy techniques
- Can an economic model for "pricing" queries based on privacy be created?
- Access control rules which model social norms

User Studies

- Study users' perception of PAC
- Study user-level privacy controls
- How to present perturbed data to applications and users?