

# Physical Access Control

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*Information Disclosure in a Community-Oriented RFID Deployment*

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Computer Science & Engineering  
University of Washington

# The RFID Ecosystem


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- RFID allows tracking of tagged objects
- tags and readers/antennas
- readers communicate with a central database

RFID tags



RFID antenna





Paul Allen Center for Computer Science and Engineering, Seattle, WA  
image from [cs.washington.edu](http://cs.washington.edu)



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



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
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- a building-wide RFID infrastructure
  - 300 RFID reader antennas
  - people carry personal tags
  - hundreds of tagged objects
- long-term research test bed




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- create information-rich environments that empower people
- allows applications such as an object or friend finder, personal reminders, and event notification
- complex social space
- useful applications require information to be disseminated
- information is actionable will likely impact social dynamics



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# A pervasive dilemma...privacy vs. utility

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divulge no information  
*perfect privacy, no utility*



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


all phenomena recorded, indexed, and shared  
*no privacy, full utility*

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— Privacy — Utility






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




Prison building at Presidio Modelo, Isla De la Juventud, Cuba  
image from Wikipedia



“The state of conscious and **permanent visibility** [assures] the automatic functioning of power...”  
Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*



Prison building at Presidio Modelo, Isla De la Juventud, Cuba  
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
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# Physical Access Control (PAC)

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- every user has access to a **personal store of data**
  - stores events that occurred when and where they were **physically present**
  - augments users' memory of places, objects, and people **encountered**
- provides **symmetric visibility**
- *principle:* start from human sensory capacity and extend from there



# Conceptual Demo

Time: 0


B's data



A's data





C's data





# Conceptual Demo

Time: 1



# Conceptual Demo

Time: 2





# How does PAC *not* model everyday experience?

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- 360° vision



screen capture from "The Big Lebowski"

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from doe.gov



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- memory does not decay



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


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- loss of **plausible deniability**




# Applications of data collected through PAC

— Privacy      — Utility



- Personal Diary applications
- Object Finder
- Personal History Analyzer

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# Modes of information disclosure

## Malicious

Personal information is compromised by unauthorized parties

Addressed by secure systems engineering



## Institutional

Organizations collect, use, and share personal and behavioral data

Addressed by contracts, federal law, corporate practice...





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
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
Addressed by contracts, federal law, corporate practice...

## Mediated

Peers and superiors access information through some authorized interface

Mediated by access control policies





# Implementation of PAC in the RFID Ecosystem

# RFID Ecosystem architecture


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tag read event (TRE): {tag identifier; antenna identifier; timestamp }



# RFID Ecosystem architecture


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# Mutual visibility

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determine whether the entities described in two tag reads were **mutually visible** (share an unobstructed line of sight)




{ Alice A ; Antenna ▲ 1 ; 08:02:45 }

{ Bob B ; Antenna ▲ 2 ; 08:02:50 }

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Mutually visible?




{ Bob B ; Antenna 2 ; 08:02:50 }



# Mutual visibility (continued)

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{ Alice  ; Antenna  ; 08:02:45 }


Mutually visible?




{ Bob  ; Antenna  ; 08:02:50 }

# Mutual visibility (continued)

- need to use antenna location as tag location



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
- need to use antenna location as tag location
- two tags read events are said to be mutually visible if they satisfy two constraints:

1) **temporal constraint:** occur within a time window  $\Delta$  of each other

2) **spatial constraint:**

A) are read by the same antenna or

B) the involved antennas are considered mutually visible



{ Alice A ; Antenna 1 ; 08:02:45 }

Mutually visible?

{ Bob B ; Antenna 2 ; 08:02:50 }




# Deployment challenges

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- antenna placement




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
- distinguishing tagged objects from tagged people



# Deployment challenges

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- distinguishing tagged objects from tagged people
- “misplaced” user tags

# Conclusion

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- start from a safe principle of symmetric visibility
- define Physical Access Control
- instantiation within an RFID deployment

**Collaborators:**

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Vibhor Rastogi

Yoshi Kohno

Dan Suciu

**Physical Access Control for Captured RFID Data**

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